World Maritime University

The Maritime Commons: Digital Repository of the World
Maritime University
Baltic Master II

Project Reports

1-2012

Oil spill preparedness in the Baltic Sea countries
Jonas Pålsson
World Maritime University, jp@wmu.se

Follow this and additional works at: http://commons.wmu.se/baltic_master2
Part of the Emergency and Disaster Management Commons, and the International and Area
Studies Commons
Recommended Citation
Pålsson, Jonas, "Oil spill preparedness in the Baltic Sea countries" (2012). Baltic Master II. 3.
http://commons.wmu.se/baltic_master2/3

This Report Open Access is brought to you courtesy of Maritime Commons. Open Access items may be downloaded for non-commercial, fair use
academic purposes. No items may be hosted on another server or web site without express written permission from the World Maritime University. For
more information, please contact library@wmu.se.

Oil spill preparedness in the Baltic
Sea countries
Report written for the Baltic Master II project
by Jonas Pålsson, World Maritime University.

Index
Abstract!......................................................................................................4
Introduction!................................................................................................5
The Baltic Sea!...........................................................................................................5
Commercial interests!...............................................................................................5
Shipping!....................................................................................................................7
Oil spills!....................................................................................................................8
Effects!.......................................................................................................................9
Cost!.........................................................................................................................10
Contingency planning!...........................................................................................10
Response preparedness!.......................................................................................10
Regulations and strategies!...................................................................................11
Current initiatives!..................................................................................................11

Material and methods!.............................................................................11
Results !.....................................................................................................12
Denmark!.................................................................................................................12
Estonia!....................................................................................................................14
Finland!....................................................................................................................15
Germany!.................................................................................................................17
Latvia!.......................................................................................................................19
Lithuania!.................................................................................................................20
Poland!.....................................................................................................................21
Russian Federation!................................................................................................23
Sweden!....................................................................................................................24
Aerial surveillance!.................................................................................................26
International conventions!.....................................................................................27
Previous oil spills!..................................................................................................27
2

Discussion!...............................................................................................30
Conclusion!...............................................................................................32
References !...............................................................................................34
Appendix 1: Contacts for the inquiry!....................................................36
Appendix 2: Oil Spill Response Vessels in the Baltic Sea!..................37

3

Abstract
The Baltic Sea is one of the world’s busiest waterways. An estimated 9 % of the world’s trade and
11 % of the world’s oil transportation passes through Baltic waters. It is estimated that this will
increase by 64 % between 2003 and 2020. For example, the oil transportation has increased by 133
% between 1997 and 2008 and is now over 250 million tonnes per year. Plenty of shallows and
narrow passages make parts of the Baltic Sea difficult to navigate. There are around 130 accidents
each year, with 10 of these leading to pollution, mostly of oil. The brackish water of the Baltic Sea
coupled with a long residence time of water, makes the flora and fauna particularly sensitive to
pollution. The Baltic Sea countries are fortunate to never have had a larger oil spill. The largest one,
the Globe Asimi in Lithuania in 1981 spilled 16 000 tonnes of oil. Compared to the larger oils spills
in other parts of the world, for example the Prestige, that spilled 63 000 tonnes, this is a small
amount.
In the Baltic Sea region, several bilateral agreements and international conventions exist to
strengthen the cross border cooperation in case of an oil spill. Annual exercises are held by the
respective countries’ Navy and Coast Guard on combatting oil spills at sea. These have held
multiple joint response operations during the HELCOM Balex Delta exercises for several years.
However, this spirit of international cooperation and capacity building has not been the case with
the land based oil spill response.
The organisation of the on land oil spill response in the Baltic Sea countries varies. Certain
countries have a centralised system, with a federal authority in charge of the response and aided by
local resources. Other countries have the local authorities in charge, who are aided by the
governmental authorities and resources.
Different countries have worked with contingency planning to a varying degree. Poland for
example have had no larger spills at all, but have invested much time and money into response
preparedness. Sweden has had several smaller to medium sized spills, but there is large variation
between the municipalities concerning the preparedness level. Different nations have set different
goals for their oil spill response as well, for example Finland is prepared for an oil spill of 30 000
tonnes, Germany for 15 000 tonnes, Sweden 10 000 tonnes and the Russian Federation for 5 000
tonnes.
The two Baltic Master projects have highlighted the changing patterns related to shipping in the
Baltic Sea and the corresponding need to continuously re-assess the threats to coastal environments
and communities. One of the important conclusions from Baltic Master II is that the preparedness to
deal effectively with oil spills at the local and regional level in most of the Baltic Sea countries is
poorly developed. Important aspects are related to the need for updated and well rehearsed
contingency plans. The need to test these plans in real exercises with regular intervals must be
emphasised in particular. Such practices will test the collaboration between different agencies
locally, the cooperation between central and local agencies, and the collaboration across borders. To
cover the cost for such an improved preparedness various funding mechanisms can be discussed,
one example highlighted in the present report is the development of a fund similar to the Finnish
model.
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Introduction
The increased maritime traffic in the Baltic Sea in the last decade has fundamentally changed the
needs for response preparedness for a major oil spill accident in the adjacent countries. Larger
tankers and more oil being transported through the Baltic Sea have also changed the risk factors of
the region. Coupled with anticipated development of both coastlines and the sea, many reports are
calling for a holistic approach to marine spatial planning. Efforts in this direction have already been
made, with the European Union’s (EU’s) Integrated Maritime Policy and Baltic Sea Strategy and
Helsinki Commission’s (HELCOM’s) Baltic Sea Action Plan. (Boverket, 2006; HELCOM, 2010a;
EU, 2009 & 2010 and WWF, 2010)
This report has been written for the EU project Baltic Master II. During the project, several
contingency plans have been written for coastal municipalities in the south Baltic Sea. Additionally,
exercises has been held in these municipalities to increase the familiarity with the written plans and
to make all participants understand the need for a plan. This has also led to an awareness rising for
the topic in the region.
The purpose of this report is to describe how the different countries around the Baltic Sea have
formed their oil spill preparedness and to identify possible weaknesses that need to be addressed.

The Baltic Sea
The Baltic Sea covers around 377 000 km² and is one of the largest brackish water bodies in the
world. It is located in the northeast part of the Atlantic, connected through first Skagerrak, then
Kattegat and finally the Danish Belt straits and the Öresund, between Denmark and Sweden. It is
divided into the Baltic Proper, the Gulf of Finland, the Bothnian Sea and the Bothnian Bay (see
figure 1). It has a shoreline to nine different countries; Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Latvia,
Lithuania, Poland, Russia and Sweden. All of these countries, except Russia, are part of the EU.
Around 85 million people live in the catchment area of the Baltic Sea, most of them in the southern
half. Besides the nine countries mentioned before, another five countries (Belarus, Czech Republic,
Norway, Slovakia and Ukraine) contribute to the runoff into the Baltic Sea. (HELCOM, 2011b)
In addition to being one of the world’s largest brackish seas, it is also very shallow. The average
depth is only 56 meters and the deepest point, Landsortsdjupet, reaches 459 meters. The lighter, less
saline water from the Baltic Sea is transported as a surface flow out through the Belt Straits and
Öresund. Heavier, more saline water flows close to the bottom into the Baltic Sea. These significant
in-flows only happen when persistent strong westerly winds prevail, historically once every 10-20
years. The limited influx of oxygenated saline water, the lack of mixing across the halocline and the
large input of nutrients and organic matter from the drainage area has led to eutrophication of the
Baltic Sea. This has led to severe oxygen depletion over significant portions of the bottom. The lack
of oxygen prevents any form of higher life, resulting in lifeless deepwater areas in 40 % of the
Baltic Sea. (Elmgren, 2001; Bernes, 2005; HELCOM, 2009; Havsmiljöinstitutet, 2011)
Commercial interests
All forms of tourism in the Baltic Sea countries, including that not related to the Baltic Sea, is
estimated to turn over 90 billion euros per year. This gives employment to around 2 million persons.
If you value different sectors, for example the pleasure boat industry including service, wharfs and
marinas, this turned over 265 million euros in Sweden alone in 2004. The Swedish sport fishing
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Figure 1: The Baltic Sea, surrounding countries and drainage area (HELCOM, 2011b).

industry with around 1 million practitioners in seas and inland waters was estimated to turn over
265 million euros in 2006. In addition to this, the recreational diving industry has around 235 000
practitioners in Sweden (Naturvårdsverket, 2009). It is much harder to set a price on the value of a
healthy sea and clean beaches in relation to the human health and non-market factors, such as
recreational factors (Baltic Master II, 2011).
The Baltic sea is also getting increasingly crowded with other kinds of commercial interests. The
laying of the gas pipe from Russia to Germany is hindering the shipping, while the finished gas line
will decrease the transportation of gas by ship. A report in 2010 from WWF estimates the wind
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Shipping
The Baltic Sea is one of the most heavily trafficked seas in the world with around 2 000 vessels
sailing its waters at any given moment. Up to 15 % of the worlds trade is transported on the Baltic
Sea and 11 % of the world’s oil transport. Given the size of the Baltic basin, this makes the Baltic
Sea one of the busiest seas in the world. The amount of oil being transported has doubled between
1997 and 2008 and forecasts indicate that both the amount of traffic and the number of tankers will
increase in the future (see figure 2). The size of the vessels is predicted to increase as well since the
Russian oil terminals in the Primorsk area recently have been expanded to accommodate tankers
carrying 150 000 tonnes of oil. With the growing demand for oil in the world and the opening of
new oil fields in Russia west of the Ural, the increase of oil and gas transport through the Baltic Sea
will increase even further in the coming years. With denser ship traffic and more and larger tankers,
the risk of accidents resulting in oil spills is increasing (HELCOM, 2011a; Sergev et al., 2009).
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farms to increase by 6 000 % within the next ten years, which will drastically change the shipping
routes, depending on where these wind farms are erected. (WWF, 2010)
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Figure 2: Amount of oil being transported through the 16 largest oil terminals in the Baltic Sea (HELCOM,
2011a).

Figure 9. Amount of oil transported via the 16 largest oil

Compared to European waters in general the Baltic Sea is overrepresented when it comes to
terminals in the Baltic Sea during 1997, and 2000-2008.
maritime accidents. About 120 to 140 are reported every year and there has been an 20 % increase
since 2006 (see figure 3). Considering the heavy traffic, this is not surprising at all. The shallow,
narrow Danish and Swedish straits connecting the Baltic with the North Sea are known bottlenecks
and notoriously difficult to navigate. Most of the groundings occur in this area, while the collisions
that occur are spread more or less evenly along the trade routes in the Baltic (HELCOM, 2011a;
2009c).

Groundings in the Baltic Sea
are more likely than collisions

The outcome of the overall risk assessment within
the Project ‘Sub-regional risk of spill of oil and
hazardous substances in the Baltic Sea’ (BRISK
Project) as well as BRISK-RU Project (www.brisk.
helcom.fi) shows that the likelihood of grounding
accidents is about ten times higher than the ship-

Part-financed by the Europ
Union (European Regional
Development Fund)
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According to the reports from the Contracting States there were 124 ship accidents in the
HELCOM area in 2010 (Figure 7), which is 19 more than the year before (increase of 18%)
and 11 less than in 2008 (decrease of 8%).

Figure 7

Figure 3: Number of accidents in the Baltic Sea and number of cases that have led to an oil spill (HELCOM,
2011a).

The spatial distribution of the reported accidents in 2010 is presented in Figure 8. As can be
noted, almost all accidents occurred very close to shore or in harbours.

Oil spills

One serious ecological impact of a shipping accident is pollution. Most of the time, this pollution
comes from oil. According to data from ITOPF, the number of large oil spill accidents in the world
are going down (see figure 4). Groundings and collisions remain the primary causes of oil spills,
with groundings the largest of the two. With the ever increasing precision of sea charts, satellite
tracking and technology on board the ships, this points to the fact that the primary cause ultimately
lies with the human factor. (ITOPF, 2011 & HELCOM, 2011a)
The fact that many of the oil tankers are old, and that single hull tankers are not yet phased out
despite the MARPOL ban in 2010, adds to this risk. The oil tanker Prestige which sank off Spain’s
Galician coast in 2002, had passed through the Baltic Sea on its journey south. Once in the stormy
waters of the Biscaya, the ship was damaged in the heavy seas, broke into two and sunk.
Approximately 63 000 tonnes of oil were spilled, contaminating 1 900 km of the Spanish, French
and British coastlines (ITOPF, 2010a). The Fu Shan Hai accident in 2003 increased the awareness
of the threats of oil spills in the Baltic Sea. The Fu Shan Hai spilled approximately 1 200 tonnes of
oil, which is a small volume in comparison with other international oil spills during the last 10
years. Had the Prestige wrecked in the Baltic Sea instead of the Bay of Biscay, extensive coastlines
would have been contaminated.
There has been a number of relatively small accidents earlier in the Baltic Sea; one of the best
documented is the Tsesis oil spill in the Stockholm archipelago in 1977. The accident which was a
grounding resulted in a spill of approximately 1 000 tonnes of heavy fuel oil. The research after that
incident and the information gathered in subsequent Baltic Sea oil spills have significantly
7
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improved understanding of the fate and impacts of oil spills in the region (Lindén et al, 1979;
Midbøe & Petersson, 2004).
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Approximately 5.71 million tonnes of oil were lost as a result of tanker incidents from 1970 to 2010. However, as Figure 4 indicates, the volume of oil spilt from tankers demonstrates a significant improvement9
through the decades. Consistent with the reduction in the number of oil spills from tankers, the volume of oil
spilt also shows a marked reduction. For instance, from Table 2 it is interesting to observe that an amount
greater than the total quantity of oil spilt between 2000 to 2009 (212,000 tonnes) was spilt in several single
years in earlier decades.

impacts may be observed, such as reproductive and behavioural effects, shifts in population
structure and habitat loss (ITOPF, 2010b; U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, 2004).
Cost
The socioeconomic cost of an oil spill has been estimated and discussed in several reports, among
them the Baltic Master report Socioeconomic impacts of major oil spills - prediction methods and
scenario studies from 2007. This report showed that the cost of socio-economic damage can be
expected to be more than twice the direct response and clean up costs (Baltic Master, 2007 & Baltic
Master II, 2011).
The clean up cost of the Exxon Valdez was estimated to be approximately €1.8 billion during the
first year alone. Claims, fines and penalties have been estimated to be €5.2 billion. Far from all the
claims have been settled, and court processes are still pending, over 20 years after the spill. The
same can be said of the Prestige. The cost of the damage was estimated to reach €1 billion not
including the damage to the ecosystem. Only a small fraction of this has been compensated for, and
the legal processes are still ongoing (IOPC, 2009; ITOPF, 2010c; 2010d). BP has as of 13 January
2011 paid out close to $5 billion in claims for the Deepwater Horizon accident to individuals,
industry and government (BP, 2011). This spill did not originate from a tanker but the impacts of the
oil to the environment are similar.
The direct clean up cost of an oil spill is not necessarily related to the amount of oil spilled. There
are various of factors that play significant roles for the final cost. Among these are location of the
spill, prevailing currents, distance to the shore, how fast and effective the response is and
accessibility to the accident site. If the clean-up is mostly performed out to sea, the cost is cut
dramatically (Yamada, 2009).

Contingency planning
Contingency planning means to plan ahead for a future accident. By establishing a work flow and
assign tasks in advance, an organisation can test different scenarios and foresee bottlenecks and
problems that will be problematic in a real incident. Hopefully, all the questions that will arise
during the planning process will be addressed in time for a real incident. Most importantly, there is
a need to exercise the plan, to see whether it works or not.
Response preparedness
Response preparedness of the Baltic Sea countries is in various stages of development. There are
several conventions and agreements (for example HELCOM, BRISK and the Copenhagen
agreement) regulating cooperation across borders and between organisations. Experience shows that
almost all marine oil spills will to some degree affect land. The problem with the existing plans,
conventions and agreements is that they are too focused on the oil spills while they are at sea. Very
little planning relates to the oil once it has reached the shoreline. Furthermore, the development of
shoreline clean up technology has been very limited during the last decades (ITOPF, 2007) Several
experts agree that greater effectiveness of the oil spill response can be achieved with preparation
(Kirby & Law, 2010).
Accordingly, HELCOM has recently shifted its focus from seaward towards shoreline response to
oil spills. For the first time in 2010, shoreline response was made an integral part of the annual
Balex Delta exercise. In addition, oiled wildlife response has been developed, together with further
recommendations added to the HELCOM response manual (HELCOM, 2010b).
10

Regulations and strategies
One of the oldest and most respected organisations working in this area is HELCOM. It is the
governing body of the "Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea
Area," commonly known as the Helsinki Convention of 1974 and 1992, the first regional
convention to address the Baltic Sea (HELCOM, 2010a).
The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973/1978, or MARPOL,
is the international treaty covering the prevention of operational or accidental pollution of the
marine environment by ships. It is a combination of two treaties and updated by amendments
through the years. 98 % of the world’s tonnage is signatory to MARPOL Annex I and II (IMO,
2002).
UNCLOS is the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea of 1982 and is widely recognised
as the constitution of the oceans. UNCLOS has been ratified by a majority of the UN’s member
states. The treaty deals with a multitude of issues in maritime and marine affairs, including
accidents resulting in discharges of hazardous substances into the oceans (UN, 2010).
The European Union (EU) has recently approved their Baltic Sea Strategy, which outlines a
comprehensive strategy for the economic development and environmental protection of the Baltic
Sea area, The aim is to improve the economy in a sustainable way, while improving the
environment (EU, 2010a).
Current initiatives
There are several on-going projects to increase the preparedness in the Baltic Sea, by creating or
updating contingency planning as well as testing them in exercises. These can be local projects, but
also international initiatives, for example EU projects or through organisations such as HELCOM.
A few examples are the Baltic Master II, BRISK and EnSaCo EU projects.

Material and methods
Data has been collected by sending out inquiries over email to identified individuals within the
respective countries’ emergency response organisations from Marcus Olsson at Region Skåne in
Sweden. The individuals have been chosen from personal contacts and recommendations gathered
during the course of the Baltic Master II project by Jonas Pålsson and Marcus Olsson and followed
up with emails and telephone calls to clarify specific points in the answers. It was compiled by
Jonas Pålsson and Marcus Olsson and written by Jonas Pålsson. Supplementary information has
been collected from the respective organisation’s web pages.
The initial emails specifically inquired about:
Responsible authorities
Who is responsible for what?
To whom do they answer?
Response chain
Who gets the first alert?
Who does he call?
How is he response initiated from the alert?
11

Equipment
What type of equipment is available?
Who has it?
Where is it?
Previous accidents
Have there been any accidents before?
Where have they been?
How much was spilled?
What was the result of the response?
Exercises
How often do you exercise?
With whom do you exercise?
Conventions ratified
What international conventions are ratified by each country?
Which conventions are not ratified?
The contact persons for the different countries are shown in Appendix 1.

Results
The preparedness situation around the Baltic Sea is diverse. Countries have different authorities
responsible for different tasks, as shown below. Other types of organisational differences exist
additionally, for example centralised command in Germany, Estonia, Denmark and Lithuania
compared to the decentralised responsibility in Sweden.

Denmark
Division of responsibility
From the 1st of January 2000, the response responsibility to oil spills or other hazardous and
noxious substances at sea and in coastal waters was moved from the Danish Ministry of the
Environment and Energy to the Danish Ministry of Defence. The Ministry of Defence has
subsequently delegated the authority to Defence Command Denmark, who delegated the
contingency function to the Admiral Danish Fleet, also called the Royal Danish Navy. The
Headquarters of the Royal Danish Navy, Søværnets Operative Kommando (SOK), is responsible for
preventing or minimising oil pollution damage to the marine environment, natural resources and
recreational areas on coastlines and beaches.
MAS (Maritime Assistance Service) is an integral part of the Danish Navy. It acts as a central
maritime contact point for shipping inside and around Danish territorial waters. The main task of
the MAS is to handle communication with the ship masters that are in need of assistance, but also
other maritime stakeholders, for example salvage companies, fleet owners and port authorities.
MAS is manned around the clock to deploy rapid assistance and professional support for ships in
need. This can be combating pollution, fire and explosions on board, collisions, groundings and
maritime security. MAS receives Ship Security Alert System distress calls from Danish and foreign
vessels in Danish waters.
12

Response and clean-up of beaches and ports are the responsibility of the coastal municipality in
question, but most often assisted by the Danish Emergency Management Agency (DEMA).
Oil producing companies and offshore oil drilling operations must have their own contingency
plans and organisation as well as equipment. The plans must be approved by the Danish
Environmental Protection Agency and must include alarm and communication chains in the
organisation and to the authorities, chain of command, equipment, capacity and location list,
response techniques, monitoring systems, access routes, crew training, temporary storage,
transportation and destruction of contaminated material and regular exercises.
Operations
In case of an oil spill, SOK will decide if a response will be initiated or not, to what extent and with
which method. If there is a need to use dispersants, the Ministry of Environment must give special
permission. If there is a larger spill, the Danish fleet will assign an On-Scene Commander (OSC) to
lead the response. Furthermore, a group will be established, with representatives from different
stakeholders, organisations and authorities. When the oil hits the shore, the affected community can
seek help from DEMA. Oily waste is transported to already established contractors, for example
Kommunen Kemi and Gunnar Lund Olieservice. For illegal discharges into the sea, the Admiral
Danish Fleet is responsible for the enforcement of the Danish Marine Environment Protection Act
in the Danish Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).
Operations at sea when it comes to oil spill response is conducted with vessels from the Admiral
Danish Fleet, the Danish Maritime Safety Administration (DaMSA) and private salvage companies,
among others. If private companies are used, these have an already established contract. During
these operations, air support is accessible through the Danish Air Force.
Equipment
The Admiral Danish Fleet uses seven vessels equipped with different quality of booms, skimmers,
pumps and other material located at the different bases of the Navy. Details of these can be found in
Appendix 2.
Additionally, tugs and salvage vessels can be hired from private contractors.
DEMA has five stockpiles of equipment in Denmark, located in Thisted, Herning, Haderslev,
Næstved and Allinge. These contain material for both shoreline response and clean-up.
Exercises
There is a national oil spill contingency plan in place and since a few years, oil spill contingency
plans for the municipalities. The national contingency plan is exercised five or six times a year, with
two or three municipalities taking part each time.
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Estonia
Division of responsibility
The role of the Ministry of the Environment is to act as the strategical coordinator in environmental
matters at international level. The responsibility for pollution both at sea and in the lakes Lämmi
and Pihkva are the responsibility of the Ministry of the Interior, who has delegated the
responsibility to the Estonian Rescue Board (ERB). The ERB is responsible for the tactical
coordination of the different national organisations and stakeholders and also coordinates the
international help.
The ERB is further subdivided into three different branches:
- Estonian Coastal Rescue Centre, with four regional centres
- Emergency centres, in four different locations
- Explosive Ordinance Disposal, with four different groups
The Joint Rescue and Coordination Centre Tallinn (JRCC Tallinn) are available around the clock
and handle calls on maritime accidents, although primarily search and rescue.
The beach clean up is the responsibility of the Estonian Rescue Board, but is delegated to the
regional rescue centres and the local municipalities.
The larger ports are responsible for their own oil spill response.
Operations
When an oil spill occurs at sea, the alarm will come to the Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) or the Gulf
of Finland reporting area (GOFREP) first. These will forward the alarm to the JRCC Tallinn and
these in turn will inform the Police and Border Guard Board (PBGB), who are responsible for the
oil spill response at sea. When the oil hits the shore, this responsibility is the Estonian Rescue Board
(ERB), who has 83 rescue service stations spread around the country. There are laws regulating the
transportation of oily waste and in Estonia, there are several locations where oil and contaminated
material can be incinerated or buried. The command centre for the response operation can,
depending on the size of the operation, be located at the respective regions’ PBGB office.
Mechanical removal of oil is the primary method used and dispersants are severely limited
according to the HELCOM recommendations. It is only allowed in the most extreme cases and then
in agreement with the Ministry of the Environment.
Equipment
The ERB uses the three tier system when it comes to response to oil spills. The response resources
are different between these tiers.
Tier 1 response, at the local level, is placed at five different locations: Kuressaare, Kärdla,
Haapsalu, Mustamäe och Kohtla-Järve and has capacity to respond to spills of 1 000 litres of light
oils at sea or on land and equip 30 volunteers with personal protection equipment.
Tier 2 response, at the regional level, is placed at four different locations: Haapsalu, Tartu,
Mustamäe och Kohtla-Järve. They have the capacity to each respond to a spill of 10 000 litres of
14

light oils at sea and on land, equip 50 volunteers with personal protection equipment for three days
and nights. They additionally have 105 coastal boom, 500mm * 200 m and 750 * 200 m beach
boom, access to hot water washers, skimmers and transport vehicles.
Tier 3 response, at the national level, is located at one location in Kose. It has capacity to eliminate
and skim both light oils and viscous oils at up to 10 m3 per hour and equip 50 volunteers with
personal protection equipment for seven days and nights. Additionally, they have equipment for bird
washing volunteers, 1 300 m coastal boom and 350 m beach boom, vacuum pumps, absorbents and
access to trucks, tanks and other all terrain vehicles for transport.
JRCC Tallinn has three response vessels. Details of these can be found in Appendix 2.
The larger ports have their own oil spill response equipment, since they are responsible for their
own clean up.
Exercises
As members of HELCOM, Estonia takes part in the Balex Delta exercises held every year.

Finland
Division of responsibility
In Finland, the Finnish Environment Institute (SYKE) is the marine pollution response authority
under the Ministry of the Environment. The Ministry of Environment has supreme management and
supervisory responsibility against oil pollution and also against other harmful substances. SYKE is
responsible for the response measures necessitated by incidents on the open sea, which includes
purchase and development of governmental oil combatting equipment. It is also responsible to give
and request international assistance to marine pollution caused by oil or other toxic substances.
SYKE also has the authority to order the undertaking of salvage operation, if a vessel is in a
position that has a risk for pollution.
The Centres for Economic Development, Transport and the Environment (ELY) give advice and
supervise the local municipalities and commercial companies on pollution response and
preparedness. When necessary, they also participate in the response operations.
The Rescue Service, who are financed by the municipalities have according to Finnish law
responsibility to uphold a response readiness and have a contingency plan in place for the respective
coastal municipalities. These oil spill contingency plans need an approval of ELY, before they are
implemented. ELY also give advice and supervise the local municipalities and commercial
companies on pollution response and preparedness. When necessary, they also participate in the
response operations.
There are three coastal region oil spill response plans and one national. If needed, the defence
forces, border guard and the Finnish traffic Safety Agency (Trafi) participate in the response, as
well as private companies.
Ports, terminals and other facilities that handle oil are required to be able to respond to realistic oil
spills in their respective facilities.
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Other authorities are obliged to assist in oil or chemical spill combatting within their abilities. The
goal is for Finland to be able to handle spills of up to 30 000 tonnes of oil.
Finland adheres to the ”Polluter Pays Principle” and has in addition to this policy a national Oil
Pollution Fund that will cover the costs for oil pollution response, when no polluter can be
identified. The fund is financed by a set tonnage fee that the transport companies pay to leave or
transport oil through Finnish waters. The administration is handled by the Ministry of the
Environment, but the compensation decision rests with an independent committee. From this fund,
the Rescue Service is then permitted to seek compensation for purchasing new equipment that is
recommended by a ELY approved contingency plan. This means that SYKE does not automatically
have access to the fund. The government has the right to apply for compensation for equipment as
well, and this is judged on a case by case basis.
Operations
The alarm most often reach the Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC/MRSC) through
radio, pilot or the Coast Guard. MRCC then contact SYKE’s officer on call. SYKE, in turn contact
the relevant authorities, initiate and coordinate the response and make sure that oil spill response
vessels, equipment and other necessary personal are at hand. The Finnish Meteorological Institute is
also contacted, to give an oil spill drift forecast.
In case of a smaller local spill, a local commander is appointed to lead the response. If the situation
is larger than the first estimate, neighbouring regions, national authorities or SYKE can be called in
for assistance.
Equipment
SYKE maintains 13 stations well equipped with booms, skimmers, pumps and other oil spill
response material. These stations are located in Oulu, Vaasa, Rahja, Pori, Uusikaupunki, Turku,
Nauvo, Hanko, Kirkkonummi, Porvoo, Kotka and two in the area of Lake Saimaa. The Finnish
government has 16 oil spill response vessels equipped with a fixed brush system and extendable
arms. Details of these can be found in Appendix 2. There is around 100 km of boom available. Out
of these, 10 km is rugged boom, which work well in oil response in rough weather out on the sea.
All the coastal communities maintain a total of 140 smaller oil spill response vessels between 10
and 20 m. Of these, 32 are equipped with oil recovery systems and the rest are used to ferry
personnel, equipment and to deploy boom. The Rescue Service within each municipality have
access to equipment to respond to oil spills in shallower and near shore waters.
Oil terminals have their own stores of equipment to be able to respond to a spill of reasonable size
in their own operations.
Finland do not have any oil spill response companies and do not use dispersants.
Exercises
Finland holds several exercises annually, both national and international. In 2011, Finland
participated in four international exercises, one in each of Estonia, Russia, Sweden and Denmark.
For the exercise in Estonia, four vessels were sent, one Navy, one Border Guard and two from
Meritaito LTD. To the exercise in Sweden, three vessels were sent and to the Danish exercise two.
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Since there are so many international exercises in 2011, no national exercises will be held, which is
otherwise the case.
The latest national exercise was arranged by Kymenlaaksos Rescue Service, close to Kotka, where
five kilometres of boom was deployed. During these exercises, personnel from SYKE are involved
both as advisors and evaluators.
In 2010, Finland conducted an exercise with EMSA, when their new response vessel Kontio, to be
stationed in the northern Baltic Sea, was inducted.
The national exercises conducted involve one or more vessels with personnel from different
organisations. These can involve internal drills to update the vessel crew on the response
equipment.
The Rescue Service has their own exercises, but involves SYKE by evaluating how fast they can
deploy at a given location with vessels, equipment and personnel.
In 2012, Finland is host to the Balex Delta exercise, which is planned a year in advance. In this
exercise, all the oil spill response organisations in Finland will participate as well as several
international vessels.

Germany
Division of responsibility
The responsibility of oil spill contingency planning is shared by the federal government through the
Federal Waterways and Shipping (WSV) within the ministry of transport and the federal coastal
states Bremen, Hamburg, Niedersachsen, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and Schleswig-Holstein. To
coordinate this preparedness the Central Command for Maritime Emergencies (CCME) was created
2003 and based in Cauxhaven. CCME is responsible to update the national oil spill response
preparedness.
Even though no requirement exist, some coastal municipalities have their own oil spill response
plans.
Individual ports are responsible for their own response and contingency plans, as well as
equipment.
Operations
In case of an oil spill at sea, the CCME will take the main responsibility after having communicated
with the Maritime Emergencies Reporting and Assessment Centre (MERC) will take the lead in the
response operation and call teams on site and to the coordination centre. CCME contain five
sections, of whom 3 will be activated. Sector 1 is the MERC, who is the national maritime
coordination point on call around the clock. Sector 2 will be responsible for the response on the sea
and sector 3 for the shoreline around the coastal states and additionally for the Wadden Sea. If
needed, the CCME will handle the entire coordination, including all the involved organisations, for
example the rescue services, disaster help corps, the marine and salvage companies. The cost will
be split equally between the federal government and the coastal state.
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Equipment
The national oil spill contingency plan include a computerised map system that detail sensitive
areas and habitats in need of special protection along the coast, called the Marine Atlas. The federal
maritime and hydrological agency have a weather and ocean current forecasting program developed
for the North Sea, the German bays, Wadden Sea and the Baltic Sea.
The coastal states of Germany have developed a software and a system for data collection and
storage of all the different kinds of data of the coastal states, including pollution caused by
accidents. The software connects the database, GIS text and photos in a multimedia user interface.
The VPS system supports the contingency planning and the response by supplying information on
among other things; contact details, organisational details, contingency routines, detailed photos of
the entire German coastline, location of oil spill equipment, vessel details and flight routes, oil
response manual, sensitive areas, accident reports, logbooks, development and tracking and oil spill
drift modelling using the SeaTrack Web program.
A wide selection, around 16, of the more or less universal oil spill response vessels are owned to a
large extent by the government. The vessels of private oil spill companies are primarily deployed
around the larger ports.
Germany regard themselves to be well prepared to handle a spill of 15 000 m3 oil if mechanical
recovery is possible. Mechanical recovery is prioritised at sea and the use of dispersants is only
allowed at depths exceeding 20 meters under exceptional circumstances.
The Federal Maritime and Hydrographic Agency (Bundesamt Für Seeschiffahrt und Hydrographie,
BSH) has a dedicated laboratory for analysing oil for the police and rescue services. It is based in
Hamburg but can on request immediately redeploy to the incident site.
Pollution response equipment for coast, river and shoreline is located at several different points in
Germany. The federal stations are Wilhelmshaven, Cuxhaven, Kiel, Warnemünde, Stralsund and the
state owned Hilgenriedersiel, Husum, Meldorf, Rostock, Cuxhaven, Stralsund, Heiligendamm, Kiel,
Wilhelmshaven, Stralsund, Bremerhaven, Bremen, Lübeck, Flensburg, Hamburg, Brunsbüttel,
Kägsdorf, Eutin, Wittmund and Jever.
The busiest sea traffic routes are constantly patrolled by around 30 Coast Guard vessels, partly to
deter, but also to look for oil spills. These vessels are operated from two Coast Guard centrals in the
North Sea and the Baltic Sea. Details of these can be found in Appendix 2.
The overflights log around 1 600 hours a year and primarily patrol the German coastline and the
busiest sea traffic routes.
Exercises
The oil spill exercises do not follow any specific schedule, but is influenced by several factors. In
practice, there are around 20 exercises per year. Participants in these exercises are the CCME and
affected municipalities. Germany does not have any dedicated Coast Guard yet, which means that
they are excluded from international exercises exclusive for the Coast Guards.
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Latvia
Division of responsibility
The Latvian Coast Guard, who are under the department of defence, are responsible for the
response in case of a national oil spill disaster. The Coast Guard have response stations in the three
largest ports, Riga, Liepaja and Ventspils. MRCC Riga, under the Latvian Coast Guard, is available
around the clock. There is a special committee that takes charge in case of a larger oil spill
catastrophe. The rescue service and municipalities are delegated by the ministry of the interior to
have responsibility of the shoreline clean up.
The municipalities have no specific oil spill contingency plans, the oil spill response responsibility
rests with the local rescue service.
Each port authority has their own oil spill contingency plan, which is linked to the national
contingency plan.
The older oil spill contingency plan from 2004 was recently replaced with a new one, that includes
Hazardous and Noxious Substances (HNS) and entered into force in May 2010.
Operations
In case of a larger oil spill, the MRCC committee in Riga will take full responsibility of the
response operation and work as a coordination centre, Both on sea and on land response will be
handled together by the Coast Guard and the rescue service. The clean up of the beaches is still the
responsibility of the coastal municipality.
In case of a smaller spill, the response is still handled by MRCC Riga, initially by the officer on call
and subsequently transferred to an oil spill coordinator.
The ports are responsible for response of oil spills in their respective areas.
Mechanical recovery of oil is the primary method of response, and the use of dispersants is
extremely limited and only possible in agreement with the ministry of environmental protection and
regional development.
Equipment
Latvia has access to three oil spill response vessels. Details of these can be found in Appendix 2.
Additionally, six smaller Navy vessels will be available to help during an oil spill response.
There is a general agreement made between the larger port authorities that they should make private
vessels available in case of an oil spill response operation in their port areas.
When building the oil spill contingency plan, a computerised environmental atlas was developed.
This will be used with a weather and ocean current modelling program to forecast where the oil will
spread.
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Exercises
The national oil spill contingency plan is exercised once a year and involve all the three response
levels, administration, coordinators and decision makers. The main actors are the impacted
municipalities, national rescue service, port authorities, the maritime administration of Latvia and
the Ocean and Lake administration.
The Latvian Coast Guard normally exercise twice per year. One is a theoretical exercise for the
coordinators and one a practical exercise for the field staff.

Lithuania
Division of responsibility
The responsible authority for guidelines and standards on oil spill contingency plans along the
Lithuanian coast is the regional department for environmental protection in Klaipėda. The
municipalities themselves are responsible for the existence of an oil spill contingency plan for
shoreline clean up. The Lithuanian Navy are responsible for the coordination and actual response.
According to the contingency plans, the civil defence can be called in if needed. In the clean up
phase of the response, the ministry of the interior will be involved as well, since they are
responsible for the rescue service.
A national oil spill contingency plan was written by the Lithuanian Maritime Institute in 1994 and
was signed in 2009 by the departments of defence, environmental protection and internal affairs.
Operations
According to the Lithuanian governments proposition no. 1378, the different authorities in an oil
spill response are based on different marine areas. The Lithuanian Navy are responsible for the
Baltic proper, through the MRCC Klaipėda and are also generally responsible for the entire
operation. They also work as the coordinators for national oil spill response and clean up. The clean
up is the responsibility of the duty officer, who delegate this to an on scene coordinator. MRCC
Klaipėda is available around the clock. The Lithuanian Coast Guard are responsible for the
Curonian lagoon and the port authorities for their own respective ports. The clean up is then the
responsibility of the individual municipalities. The civil defence can offer manpower to help with
shoreline clean up along the whole of the Lithuanian coast.
The use of dispersants is forbidden and should be extremely limited, according to the HELCOM
recommendations. If such a situation arises, an approval must first come from the ministry of the
environment.
Equipment
Most of the oil spill response material and equipment in Lithuania are available at the MRCC in
Klaipėda, partly onboard their vessels and partly in warehouses on land. The surveillance using
Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) is also managed here.
In cooperation with the Lithuanian air force, there is aerial surveillance using EMSA’s 2nd
generation CleanSeaNet 2-4 times a month.
A computer based system detailing sensitive areas and more sensitive areas along the coast exists.
The oil spill drift model used is HELCOM’s SeaTrack Web program.
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In case of a larger spill, the Coast Guard has a vessel equipped with skimmer. The Marine can
contribute with additional vessels. The port authority in Būtingė can use their retrofitted tug. Details
of these can be found in Appendix 2.
Every municipality have responsibility for their own coastline and have generally only less
specialised equipment, like shovels and road scrapers.
The oil terminal in Būtingė has its own booms, skimmers, brushes, tanks and pumps in addition to
well trained personnel. This equipment is spread through all the ports.
Exercises
In order to constantly develop and improve the oil spill response, Lithuania is annually participating
in international, national and regional exercises. Participating actors are the Coast Guard, air force
helicopters, Navy vessels and private companies, particularly the Polish oil company PKN Orlen
and the Būtingė oil terminal, where PKN Orlen is a majority owner.

Poland
Division of responsibility
In Poland, it is the Ministry of the Environment that is the main governmental authority responsible
for management of the environment. The Ministry of Infrastructure is responsible for the
environmental issues relating to maritime transport.
The responsible ministry is responsible for the maritime administration and the maritime economy.
It answers to the Ministry of Infrastructure and has mandate from the Marine Areas Administration
act. The responsibility for the response itself is delegated to the Maritime Search And Rescue
Service (SAR Service), who are responsible for the SAR convention and is located in Gdynia.
Under the SAR Service, there is an operational department with four specialised divisions, the
Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC), Maritime Search and Rescue Division, Maritime
Pollution Combating Division and the Information Centre of the Sea Administration. MRCC is the
national contact in case of an oil spill at sea.
When it comes to pollution in the port areas, this is the responsibility of the harbour master. Oil
terminals and wharfs are responsible for pollution related to their own operations and is reviewed
by the harbour master or environmental inspectors from the relevant maritime administration.
The local oil spill contingency plans are coordinated with SAR Service together with the local
rescue services and is then approved by the director of the relevant maritime office. The local plans
are integrated in the national contingency plan. The plan includes, contact points, different ways to
report and alarm in case of pollution incidents, list and location of measures and equipment to
combat environmental and pollution threats, an action plan, a pollution risk assessment, tasks for
the different response organisations, financial issues, guidelines for international assistance, training
plan, oil spill effect monitoring programme and a list of experts.
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The responsibility of the contingency planning and the operative response is the overall
responsibility of the response and clean up on sea and land is the ministry of the interior, who work
through three coastal regional crisis management centres.
Operations
MRCC Gdynia is the national contact point for safety of life at sea and marine pollution. If an alarm
is received anywhere else, for example the coastal radio stations or one of the three communications
centres around the coast, the MRCC Gdynia is alerted as well.
In case of an oil spill, the officer in charge of the maritime office has the responsibility to judge the
situation and act accordingly.
The areas of responsibility of SAR Service when it comes to oil spill response are the open sea,
coastal shallow waters and ports. In all of these cases, the response works through the contingency
plan, either at local level or the relevant national level.
When the oil hits land, the officer in charge alerts the regional (Voivodship) governor as well as the
regional environmental inspectors, who then work through the county and down to the municipal
level. If the oil spill should impact more than one region, the national crisis management centre
would be utilised.
The only company that do oil prospecting in Poland is Petrobaltic Co. Ltd. This company has 1 000
m booms, several smaller skimmers and experience to assist in case of a larger oil spill. They also
have five vessels in Gdansk; Afrodite, Bazalt, Granit, Santa Barbara and Vivero.
Poland primarily uses mechanical methods for recovering oil at sea and follow the HELCOM
recommendations for dispersants. This means that the use of dispersants is restricted and must have
an approval from the maritime authorities.
A new version of the national oil spill contingency plan was approved in February 2006 and
contains among other things a marine atlas of sensitive areas and temporary storage locations for
oily waste. Additionally, the refinery in Gdansk is prepared to receive recovered oil.
Equipment
SAR Service have three custom built vessels for oil spill response at sea. Details of these can be
found in Appendix 2.
The different maritime rescue stations are located in Darłowo, Dziwnów, Kołobrzeg, Łeba,
Sztutowo, Świbno, Trzebież, Ustka and Władysławowo. Additionally, there are two warehouses
with oil spill response equipment in Gdynia and Świnoujście.
The larger ports have their own oil spill response material for Tier 1 (local) and some even have
material for a Tier 2 (regional) oil spill. If the spill is larger still, SAR Service will assist with
material.
Exercises
SAR Service recommend that the contingency plans are exercised once a year, but the requirements
are for every other or every third year only. There is no requirement to have a larger exercise
22

regularly. A larger exercise was held during summer of 2011 involving SAR Service, the navy, port
authorities in Gdynia, the commercial port, the maritime administration, the rescue service and the
crisis management centre of Gdynia.
Internationally, the Polish Navy frequent the Balex Delta exercises of HELCOM and Polish SAR
Service has operational agreements with the German Pollution Response Service and the port of
Kaliningrad.

Russian Federation
Division of responsibility
The State Marine Pollution Control, Rescue and Salvage Administration (MPCRSA) is the national
authority that is responsible for oil spills at sea. It is organised under the Sea and River Transport
Agency of the Ministry of Transport. The Federal Sea and River Transport Agency is the authority
that, when needed, will conduct a revision of the national oil spill response plan. This was last done
in 2003 and approved by the ministry of commerce, the ministry of natural resources, the ministry
of defence and the Ministry of Civil Defence, Emergencies and Elimination of Consequences of
Natural Disaster (EMERCOM). This oil spill contingency plan is planned for a spill of 5 000
tonnes.
The federal Sea and River Transport Agency has the responsibility to uphold search and rescue
response. This is done through the MPCRSA and Maritime Rescue Co-ordination Centre (MRCC).
MRCC have both regional stations and assisting centres.
The Russian Federation has developed oil spill contingency plans for all of their regions, the Baltic
Sea, the Black Sea, NW Pacific, the Caspian Sea and the Arctic. The oil spill response can be
activated at the local, regional and federal level.
All companies that handle oil during transportation or loading must have an oil spill contingency
plan and material. This material can be requisitioned to a disaster site, if needed. Either to help the
rescue service at a beach cleanup, or MPRCRSA at sea.
Operations
In case of an oil spill in the Russian waters of the Baltic Sea, the MRCC in St. Petersburg will
initiate a search and rescue response and coordinate the initial response. They will then only work
as a communication centre, since the responsibility for the response operation rests on MPCRSA.
The land based response is the responsibility of EMERCOM. In case of a Tier 3 response,
EMERCOM is also responsible for the coordination of the Navy, Boarder Guard and local
municipalities. The regional part of the MPCRSA can supply resources for the response and
resources from EMERCOM can also be deployed, if there is a need.
MPCRSA has the full responsibility for the Basin Salvage and Towage Company (BASU). This is a
government owned company that is part of the MPCRSA’s regional branch and is to be available for
salvage and towing operations. If an oil spill should be greater than the local capacity of the Tier 1
response (0-500 tonnes) and the regional Tier 2 response, (500-5 000 tonnes), it is the responsibility
of the MPCRSA to mobilise the national Tier 3 response supplies.
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The general strategy for oil spill response is that Tier 1 spills will be dealt with using mechanical
recovery, if the weather allows. Tier 2 and 3 response is depending on the circumstances for that
particular spill. It is not forbidden to use dispersants and in-situ burning. However, it has to be
approved by the government and included in the oil spill contingency plan before it is used.
If there is an oil spill in a company, their oil spill contingency plan will be activated. If the
company’s own resources are insufficient for the spill, they are bund to inform the local and
regional authorities. In that case, the regional contingency plan will be activated. If this also proves
insufficient, the federal oil spill contingency plan and resources will be mobilised.
Equipment
Details of the Russian response vessels can be found in Appendix 2.
All ports, terminals and other companies storing oil must have oil spill contingency plans and
equipment in case of an oil spill. A fundamental part of this plan is to assess the resources required
to respond to a worst case scenario. This means that these companies should have their own
response teams or have a contract with companies that has the resources for this task.
The equipment of these companies usually contain vessels, booms, skimmers and other equipment.
The ports of Murmansk, St. Petersburg, Vladivostok and Sakhalin all have oil spill response vessels,
supply vessels, booms, trawls, pumps etc. There is even a few private and local oil spill response
companies stationed here.
The first of these companies approved for oil spill response at sea and on land is Ecoshelf Ltd and
was founded in 1997. Ecoshelf cooperates with Sakhalin Energy and is responsible for Sakhalin’s
oil spill response. Ecoshelf has several vessels and oil spill response material. There is an Ecoshelf
station in Vyborg called Ecoshelf Baltic servicing the oil terminal of Lukoil in Vysotsk, a Ecoshelf
Black Sea in Novorossijsk and an Ecoshelf Caspian Sea in Astrakhan.
Exercises
Both local municipalities and companies that handle oil conduct their own exercises. In the summer
of 2010, a federal oil spill exercise was held outside the port of Vysotsk. The exercise started at the
oil spill terminal and subsequently expanded through the regional, national and international levels.
In October 2011, the Environmental Protection committee conducted an exercise, where they
invited different authorities and companies. Sadly, there was a lack of representation from the
regional and federal rescue services.

Sweden
Division of responsibility
The Swedish Coast Guard is responsible for marine pollution at sea since 1971. This mandate
extends to the great lakes of Sweden, Vänern, Vättern and Mälaren and the responsibility extends
all the way to the shoreline, although in reality, the Coast Guard vessels can generally not come
close to shore. There are 25 Coast Guard stations around the Swedish coast.
No authority has overall responsibility for oil spill contingency plans on land and no requirements
exists to have such a plan. Some municipalities and counties have developed such a plan anyway, or
are in the process of developing one. According to a Swedish survey, 31 % of the Swedish
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municipalities had an oil spill contingency plan that had been used in an exercise in the last 5 years
in 2011. (Baltic Master II, 2011b)
The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB) oversee strategic rescue service operations and
encourage development of plans. They are responsible for upholding the response preparedness on
land, in five regional centres around Sweden and the Swedish lakes.
The Swedish Agency for Marine and Water Management (SwAM) has a standing contract with an
environmental consultancy firm to uphold a specialist team of oil spill experts. This team can be
called in to assist the municipalities in case of an oil spill, free of charge for the municipality in
question.
Ports and private companies are responsible for their own operational needs.
Operations
The alarm is first received at the Coast Guard coordination centre and the regional officer will act as
the commanding officer in charge of the response. There are checklists available for the continued
alarm chain to the relevant authorities in the effected municipalities and counties. If the oil spill is
large, international help can be requested.
The Coast Guard only use mechanical removal of oil and has no permission to use dispersants.
Some existing systems could, potentially, be used for dispersant application.
The shoreline response is the responsibility of the local Rescue Service. The Swedish law dictates
that the response phase is finished when the risk for injuries and property damage can no longer be
increased. This then turns into the clean-up phase, which is the local municipality’s responsibility.
In case of a larger oil spill, the Rescue Service can request assistance from MSB’s regional centres.
Equipment
The Swedish Coast Guard has several vessels designed for oil spill response. Details of these can be
found in Appendix 2. They have additional supplies such as pumps, skimmers, boom and containers
in store.
MSB has five mobile oil spill centres in different regions of the country. The idea is to complement
the resources of the municipalities, if they are insufficient. The supply units are located in Botkyrka,
Vänersborg, Karlskrona, Umeå and Visby.
The centres are loaded in containers and ready to be deployed where necessary. They contain, boats,
boat trailers, pumps, skimmers, boom, shore protection cloth, temporary storage units, all terrain
vehicles, shovels, buckets and personal protection gear for 200 persons and various additional
material, such as digital cameras, radios and high pressure steamers.
Oil terminals, ports and other companies that handle oil are required to have a basic preparedness to
be able to handle their own accidents and pollution.
The County Administrative Boards of Sweden have an Environmental Atlas, showing priority sites
and different coastal zones. The atlas, however, has several data gaps and does not encompass the
entire Swedish coastline and several counties are in the process of updating the material.
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Sweden also uses the SeaTrack Web oil spill drift forecast model.
Photo: Nikolay Vlasov, HELCOM

Exercises
Sweden holds annual exercises under the Copenhagen agreement, Bonn agreement and HELCOM.
Only in the last five years have they started including shoreline response.
On the stations around Sweden where oil spill response vessels are located, there are continuos
exercises. Additional exercises are conducted with the Swedish Sea Rescue Society (SSRS), since
they have several stations with ”First Aid” booms, which are 200 m boom an a sea sled. The Coast
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International conventions
There are several
Annex 1international conventions governing marine pollution in the Baltic Sea region
made by the IMO. Table 1 gives an overview of the relevant conventions and their status. Most
of IMO
conventions
relating
to ship-source
in theexcept
states Sweden.
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Bunkers
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has been
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by all themarine
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x
x
x
x
x
x
x

OPRC/HNS 2000

x

x

HNS Convention 96

d

d
x
d
d

OPRC Convention 90

x

x

x
x
x
x
x
x
x

SALVAGE Convention 89

x

x

x

FUND Protocol 2003

x

x

FUND Protocol 92

x

d
d
d
d
x

FUND Protocol 76

x

x

x
x
x
x
x

FUND Convention 71

x

x
x

x
x
x
x
x

CLC Protocol 92

x

x

CLC Protocol 76

x

x

CLC Convention 69

x

x
x
x
x
x
x
x

INTERVENTION Protocol 73

x
x
x
x
x
x
x

INTERVENTION Convention
69

x
x
x
x
x
x
x

London Convention Protocol 96

MARPOL 73/78 (Annex V)

x
x
x
x
x
x
x

London Convention 72

MARPOL 73/78 (Annex IV)

x
x
x
x
x
x
x

MARPOL Protocol 97 (Annex
VI)

MARPOL 73/78 (Annex III)

Denmark
Estonia
Finland
Germany
Latvia
Lithuania
Poland
Russian
Federation
Sweden

MARPOL 73/78 (Annex I/II)

Table 1: Status
conventions
to ship-source
marineetc.
pollution
in the states
of the Baltic region.
In of
theIMO
following
table x relating
means accession,
ratification,
and d means
denunciation
In the table, x means accession, ratification, etc. and d means denunciation (Baltic Master II, 2011c).

x
x
x
x
x
x

x
x

x

x

Previous oil spills
There has never been a major oil spill in the Baltic Sea. As stated before, the largest oil spill in the
Baltic Sea was the Globe Asimi outside Klaipėda in Lithuania 1981, who spilled 16 000 tonnes.
Comparing this to other spills that have occurred in the rest of the world, the amount of oil spilt is
not very significant (see table 2). The different Baltic Sea countries have been affected by oil spills
at different frequencies as well. Poland has been fortunate to never have had an oil spill, while
Estonia and Finland have reported a great number of smaller spills over the years. This is both a
blessing and a curse, since the Baltic Sea has been spared a potentially disastrous event, but it has
also caused the preventive and response work in the area to have a low priority. As always seem to
be the case, preventive measures are difficult to implement until a significant accident actually
happens.
Table 2: Large oil spill accidents in the world and in the Baltic Sea (adapted from ITOPF, 2011).

Name

Year

Location

Spill size (tonnes)

Atlantic Empress

1979

Off Tobago, West Indies

287 000

ABT Summer

1991

700 nm off Angola

260 000

Castillo de Bellver

1983

Off Saldanha Bay, South
Africa

252 000

Amoco Cadiz

1978

Off Brittany, France

223 000

Haven

1991

Genoa, Italy

144 000

Odyssey

1988

700 nm18
off Nova Scotia,
Canada

132 000

Torrey Canyon

1967

Scilly Isles, UK

119 000

Irenes Serenade

1980

Navarino Bay, Greece

100 000
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Name

Year

Location

Spill size (tonnes)

Urquiola

1976

La Coruna, Spain

100 000

Hawaiian Patriot

1977

300 nm off Honolulu

95 000

Independenta

1979

Bosphorus, Turkey

95 000

Jakob Maersk

1975

Oporto, Portugal

88 000

Braer

1993

Shetland Islands, UK

85 000

Khark 5

1989

120 nm off Marocco

80 000

Aegean Sea

1992

La Coruna, Spain

74 000

Sea Empress

1996

Milford Haven, UK

72 000

Nova

1985

Off Kharg Island, Gulf of Iran

70 000

Katina P

1992

Off Maputo, Mozambique

66 700

Prestige

2002

Off Galicia, Spain

63 000

Exxon Valdez

1989

Prince William Sound, Alaska

37 000

Globe Asimi

1981

Klaipėda, Lithuania

16 000

Antonio Gramsci

1979

Åland, Finland

5 500

Weston

1998

Västra Götaland county,
Sweden

4 000

North Pacific

2001

Klaipėda, Lithuania

3 427

Baltic Carrier

2001

Kadetrenden, Denmark

2 700

Volgoneft 139

2007

Kerch strait, Black Sea

2 000

Fu Shan Hai

2003

Ystad, Sweden

1 200

Tsesis

1977

Stockholm, Sweden

1 000

Volgoneft

1990

Karlskrona, Sweden

1 000

Antonio Gramsci

1987

Vaarlshti, Finland

650

Esso Nordica

1970

Pellinki, Finland

600

Golden Trader

2011

NW of Denmark

500

Pensa

1970

Hailuoto, Finland

500

Tolmiros (suspect)

1987

Västra Götaland county,
Sweden

400

Sotka

1985

Märket, Finland

370

Eira

1984

Merenkurkku, Finland

300

Unknown

1988

Torekov, Sweden

287

Alambra

2000

Muuga harbour, Estonia

250

Raphael

1969

Emäsalo, Finland

250

Pallas

1998

Wadden Sea, Germany

244

Thuntank 5

1987

Bay of Gävle, Sweden

230

Herakles

2004

Grundkallen, Sweden

200

Palva

1969

Utö, Finland

200

Unknown

1992

Västra Götaland and Halland
counties, Sweden

200

Hual Trooper

1995

Öresund, Sweden

180
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Name

Year

Location

Spill size (tonnes)

Godafoss

2009

Hvaler, Norway

112

Kihnu

1993

Kopli peninsula, Estonia

100

Lloyd Bage

1979

Harmaja, Finland

100

Nunki

1998

Kalundborg Fjord, Denmark

100

Runner 4

2006

Gulf of Finland

100

4
3
2
1
0

2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993
1992
1991
1990
1989
1988
1987
1986
1985
1984
1983
1982
1981
1980
1979
1978
1977
1976
1975
1974
1973
1972
1971
1970
1969

Number of spills over 100 tonnes

The number of oil spills since 1969 that has been over 100 tonnes in the Baltic Sea has been pretty
steady. There are too few spills to assess any trends (see figure 6). In Estonia, there are several
reports each year of smaller observed oil slicks, possibly from cleaning the tanks. Fortunately, these
seem to be decreasing, with 99 in 2007, 69 in 2008, 59 in 2009 and 50 in 2010. These reports are
not all due to actual oil spills. Several minor oil spills have been reported both at sea and in the
rivers Elbe and Weser in Germany. There are also minor spills each year in the port and around
Klaipėda harbour in Lithuania. No major oil spills have been documented in Poland. Few accidents
have been reported for the Russian Federation in the Baltic Sea, but several of the accidents in
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania happened when they were part of the Soviet Union. It is also
uncertain just how many accidents have been reported.

Year

Figure 6: Major oil spills since 1969 in the Baltic Sea from the table above.
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Discussion
The Baltic Sea states are prepared for an oil spill. How well prepared they are differ, however, and
how they would respond to a larger spill is still untested. The number or amount of spills is not
correlated to the preparedness level of the country. For example, Poland has a national contingency
plan, despite never having an oil spill, while Sweden, who have had several, does not. Instead this is
tied to the organisational structure of the countries and the level of autonomy that the different
regions have.
The Deepwater Horizon event in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010 clearly showed that even a country
with a well organised response, regular exercises and well equipped and trained personnel may not
have sufficient capability to handle an oil spill of a significant magnitude. There are no offshore
platforms in the Baltic Sea as large as the ones in the Gulf of Mexico, but smaller ones exist. Three
are located in Polish waters, Baltic Beta, Petro Baltic and PG-1 and one, MLSP D-6, is in Russian
waters. They drill in between 25 and 35 m of water and produce. The Kravtsovskoye oil well was
discovered in 1983. The oil produced is transported via pipelines to the mainland. The Russian oil
rig spills about 140 tonnes of oil each year and is located 22,5 kilometres from the Kaliningrad
coastline, close to the UNESCO World Heritage site the Curonian Spit. (WWF, 2010 & offshore
technology.com, 2011)
However, the main concern is shipping. Although the size of new tankers is increasing, these
vessels are also modern and have highly trained crew. ITOPF statistics show that the amount of oil
spilled from tankers is going down worldwide, but the number of oil spills from other vessels is
increasing (see figure 7, ITOPF, 2011). Some of the larger vessels today carry more oil as fuel than
some of the smaller tankers.
18
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2008
Non tanker
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Figure 7: Number of oil spills ITOPF has attended from tanker and non-tanker sources. (ITOPF, 2011)
Figure 4: ITOPF spill activity by tanker or non tanker
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hull tankers. Response measures are things like increasing the number of ships, training staff and
buying equipment. Both categories of measures will probably have to be increased to have an
efficient preparedness in the future.
The Baltic Sea has been fortunate to not have had any major oil spills. No rule changing accident,
like the Torrey Canyon accident changed liability by leading to the Civil Liability Convention 1969
(CLC 69) and the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships in 1973
(MARPOL 73), the Exxon Valdez set a new litigation record for the time and led to the passing of
the Oil Pollution Act 1990 (OPA 90) in the US. The recent Deepwater Horizon has turned out to be
a similar wake up call for deep sea drilling, raising issues with the safety in drilling at deeper depths
and in increasingly hostile and sensitive environments. No such catastrophe has so far taken place
in the Baltic Sea.
But different countries has despite this worked with contingency planning to a varying degree.
Poland for example have had no documented larger spills at all, but have invested much time and
money into response preparedness. Sweden has had several smaller to medium sized spills, but
there is large variation between the municipalities concerning the preparedness level. Different
nations have set different goals for their oil spill response as well, for example Finland is prepared
for an oil spill of 30 000 tonnes, Germany for 15 000 tonnes, Sweden 10 000 tonnes and the
Russian Federation for 5 000 tonnes. The changing risk situation in the Baltic is a good argument to
increase this number, since larger vessels mean that an accident with a large spill is more probable
than before, compared to the smaller vessels.
Several reports, for example the EU Maritime Spatial Planning policy (EU, 2010a), WWF Future of
the Baltic Sea report 2010, the Swedish National Board of Housing, Building and Planning’s
(Boverket’s) report 2006 and the HELCOM Baltic Sea reports, acknowledge and even highlight the
need for a holistic view to integrated coastal zone management and marine spatial planning. These
reports would suggest a consensus on the need for this approach. The details and priorities for this
planning, however, are quite different in the reports, but the main findings are clear: to create a
sustainable development for the future. This includes the risks associated with the modern day of
life, and should consequently include oil spill contingency planning. Sadly, there seem to be a lack
of integration in oil spill contingency planning and Integrated Coastal Zone Management (ICZM).
Increased cooperation is good and the region has held several exercises together, through
HELCOM’s Balex Delta exercises (see figure 8) or through other agreements, for example for the
Copenhagen agreement. However, this history of cooperation has been focussed on the at sea
response and little to no effort has been spent on increasing cooperation between different shoreline
response exercises. It is only during the last few years that shoreline response has been included on
the agenda during the response. For the Balex Delta exercises, this was included in 2010 in Finland
and Estonia and 2011 on Bornholm and for the Copenhagen agreement exercises during 2008 on
Gotland, 2009 in Karlshamn, 2010 in Gothenburg and 2011 in Nynäshamn.
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Nikolay Vlasov, HELCOM

Host country and the number of Contracting Parties involved in BALEX DELTA exercises since 2000
2000 Russia:

5 countries, 12 ships, 1 aircraft

2001 Denmark:

7 countries, 11 ships, 2 aircraft

2002 Latvia:

6 countries, 18 ships, 2 aircraft

2003 Finland:

5 countries, 16 ships

2004 Germany:

6 countries, 11 ships, 1 aircraft

2005 Sweden:

7 countries, 19 ships, 2 aircraft

2006 Poland:

7 countries and EMSA, 23 ships, 3 aircraft

2007 Estonia:

6 countries and EMSA, 17 ships, 1 helicopter

2008 Russia:

6 countries and EMSA, 18 ships, 2 helicopters

Figure 8: Number of involved countries in the HELCOM Balex Delta exercises.

The trend of fewer number of observed oil spills during the aerial surveillance of the Baltic Sea
countries is encouraging. However, these overflights are still mostly performed during daylight, and
the drop may simply reflect a change in behaviour of the polluters. Since only 8 cases, or 4,5 % of
spills could be traced to a transgressor in 2009, the chance of actually being caught and prosecuted
for an illegal and intentional discharge is slim. (HELCOM, 2011c) The low chance of prosecution
Nikolay Vlasov, HELCOM
does
not exactly discourage illegal behaviour of this kind, but seems to be working regardless.
10

Conclusion
There are several recommendations that could be made to increase the preparedness against oil
spills in the Baltic Sea. There exists a substantial preparedness for oil spill accidents in the Baltic
Sea. However, during the course of the project, the following reflections and recommendations for
improvements have been discussed.
The two Baltic Master projects have highlighted the changing patterns related to shipping in the
Baltic Sea and the corresponding need to continuously re-assess the threats to coastal environments
and communities. Oil spill contingency plans have been written and many bilateral agreements exist
that have regular cross border exercises (Copenhagen agreement, Nordic agreement, Baltic
Agreement, EMSA, etc). This all serves to increase the preparedness around the Baltic Sea, but
several municipalities and areas still have a long way to go to be sufficiently prepared for an oil
spill. It would be beneficial for these areas to build up experience on this issue by creating and
maintaining an oil spill contingency plan. But to be able to have a useful plan, it needs to be tested
and exercised regularly. USCG recommendations are a tabletop exercise once a year, which seems
like a good idea. Such practices will test the collaboration between different agencies locally, the
cooperation between central and local agencies, and the collaboration across borders. To help in this
endeavour, Baltic Master II has developed an oil spill planning guide, to help local municipalities to
write contingency plans and exercise them. This guide has been translated to several languages.
Since the designation of the Baltic Sea as a PSSA, traffic separation schemes and ship monitoring
systems, for example GOFREP and BELTREP have been put in place, with a decreasing number of
accidents in these areas as a consequence. The proven efficiency of such a system suggests that it
would be beneficial to create a system that spans the whole of the Baltic Sea, for increased safety of
a seafarers, the goods they carry and the environment they travel through.
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To cover the cost for such an improved preparedness various funding mechanisms can be discussed,
one example highlighted in the present report is the development of a fund similar to the Finnish
model. To have a small levy on the oil being transported through the Baltic Sea, there could be
enough funds to regularly hold exercises, as well as periodically pay for replacement of equipment.
The levy itself wouldn’t have to be larger than a fraction of the amount the price of the gasoline
changes daily for the consumer, but would still generate enough revenue for a well equipped and
exercised oil spill response organisation.
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Appendix 1: Contacts for the inquiry
Country

Name

Organisation

DK

Jesper
Vincent

EE

Silver Vahtra

EE

Are Piel

Fi

Heli
Haapasaari

LV

Ojars Gerke

LT

Valdemaras
Lithuanian Navy
Dima

Søværnets
Operative
Kommando
Ministry of the
Environment
Estonian Maritime
Administration
Finnish
Environmental
Administration
Latvian Coast
Guard Service

Maritime Search
and Rescue
Service
Admiral Markarov
State Maritime
Academy

E-mail

Webpage

pol.con.den@sok.dk

http://forsvaret.dk/SOK

silver.vahtra@envir.ee

http://www.envir.ee/

are.piel@vta.ee

http://www.vta.ee

heli.haapasaari@ymparisto.fi

http://www.ymparisto.fi

ojars@mrcc.lv

http://www.mrcc.lv

valdemaras.dima@mil.lt

http://kariuomene.kam.lt

marek.reszko@sar.gov.pl

http://www.sar.gov.pl/

aorekhov@mtc.spb.su

http://makarov.spb.ru

PL

Marek
Reszko

RU

Alexey
Orekhov

DE

Wolfgang
wknopf@havariekommando.
http://
Haverikommando
Knopf
de
www.havariekommando.de

SE

Margaretha
Ericsson

SE

Bernt Stedt

SE

Peter
Hellberg

Swedish Civil
Contingencies
Agency
Swedish Coast
Guard

margaretha.ericsson@msb.se

www.msb.se

bernt.stedt@kustbevakningen
http://
.se
www.kustbevakningen.se/

Swedish Maritime peter.hellberg@sjofartsverket.s
http://www.sjofartsverket.se/
Administration
e
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Appendix 2: Oil Spill Response Vessels in the Baltic Sea
Country

Name

Type

Equipment

Denmark A562 Mette
Miljø

Seatruck class
support vessel

2 x 200 m Ro-Boom
Komara skimmers
Destroil 250
Ro-Sweep boom system
Can work in gas filled environment
Storage capacity 63,8 m3

Denmark A563 Marie
Miljø

Seatruck class
multi-purpose
vessel

2 x 200 m Ro-Boom
Komara skimmers
Destroil 250
Ro-Sweep boom system
Can work in gas filled environment
Storage capacity 63,8 m3

Denmark A560 Gunnar
Thorson

Supply class multipurpose vessel

3 x 200 m Ro-Boom
5 x Expandi booms
Belt skimmer
Desmi Terminator
Destroil 250
Ro-Sweep boom system
Storage capacity of 311,3 m3

Denmark A561 Gunnar
Seidenfaden

Supply class multipurpose vessel

3 x 200 m Ro-Boom Ocean booms
5 x Expandi booms
Belt skimmer
Desmi Terminator
Destroil 250
Ro-Sweep boom system
Storage capacity of 311,3 m3

Denmark MS201

Barge

Storage capacity 300 m3
Additional room for 60 m3

Denmark MS202

Barge

Storage capacity 300 m3
Additional room for 60 m3

Denmark MS203

Barge

Storage capacity 300 m3
Additional room for 60 m3

Denmark Y340 Miljø 101

Oil recovery vessel

Storage capacity 0,4 m3

Denmark Y341 Miljø 102

Oil recovery vessel

Storage capacity 0,4 m3

Denmark Y342 Miljø 103

Oil recovery vessel

60 cm draft
Brush skimmer
Floating bag system

Estonia

PVL-202 Kati

Oil recovery vessel

200 m boom
Side mounted skimmers with 160
m3/h capacity
Ice skimmer with 60 m3/h capacity

Estonia

PVL-109 Valvas

Oil recovery vessel

800 m boom
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Country

Name

Estonia

Type

Equipment

Oil recovery vessel

Operational in 2011
600 m boom
Side mounted skimmers with 200
m3/h capacity
Ice skimmer with 60 m3/h capacity

Finland

Halli

Oil recovery vessel

Sweeping arm system
Storage capacity 1 400 m3

Finland

Hylje

Oil recovery vessel

Sweeping arm system
Storage capacity 800 m3

Finland

Kummeli

Oil recovery vessel

Sweeping arm system
Storage capacity 70 m3

Finland

Letto

Oil recovery vessel

Sweeping arm system
Storage capacity 43 m3

Finland

Linja

Oil recovery vessel

Sweeping arm system
Storage capacity 77 m3

Finland

Louhi

Oil recovery vessel

Sweeping arm system
Storage capacity 1 200 m3

Finland

Merikarhu

Oil recovery vessel

Sweeping arm system
Storage capacity 40 m3

Finland

Oili I

Oil recovery vessel

Sweeping arm system
Storage capacity 80 m3

Finland

Oili II

Oil recovery vessel

Sweeping arm system
Storage capacity 80 m3

Finland

Oili III

Oil recovery vessel

Sweeping arm system
Storage capacity 80 m3

Finland

Sektori

Oil recovery vessel

Sweeping arm system
Storage capacity 108 m3

Finland

Seili

Oil recovery vessel

Sweeping arm system
Storage capacity 198 m3

Finland

Svärtan

Oil recovery vessel

Sweeping arm system
Storage capacity 52 m3

Finland

Tursas

Oil recovery vessel

Sweeping arm system
Storage capacity 100 m3

Finland

Uisko

Oil recovery vessel

Sweeping arm system
Storage capacity 100 m3

Latvia

A-90 Varonis

Oil recovery vessel

2008 retrofitted Navy vessel
800 m Ro-Boom 1500
2 x Lamor OPC-4 skimmers
Floating skimmer
Desmi Terminator
Storage capacity 110 m3

Latvia

KA-14-Astra

Oil recovery vessel

2 x Lamor OPC-4 skimmer

Latvia

JL-1

Barge

Lamor OPC-4 skimmer
Desmi Terminator
Storage capacity 100 m3
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Lithuania MRCC

Oil recovery vessel

2 x 250 m Ro-Boom 2000
Lamor Skimmer
Desmi Terminator
Dispersant spray system
Storage capacity 228 m3
4 hour deployment time

Lithuania Coast Guard

Oil recovery vessel

Vikoma skimmer
Storage capacity 25 m3

Poland

Kapitan Poinc

Oil recovery vessel

2 x 45 m Lamor arm system and 140
m3/h capacity
900 m Ro-Boom 1500
90 m Expandi 4300 boom
Desmi Terminator skimmer with
Scantrawl system and 100 m3/h
capacity
Storage capacity 512 m3

Poland

Zodiac

Oil recovery vessel

Lamor arm and brush system
Storage capacity 2 x 36 m3

Poland

Czestaw II

Oil recovery vessel

2 x Lamor arm systems and 20 m3/h
capacity
340 m Expandi 4300 boom
Komara 12k skimmer with 12 m3/h
capacity
Vicospray 1000 dispersant spray
system with 4,2 m3/h capacity
Storage capacity 20 m3

Russia

Yasnyy

Supply vessel

70 m3/h capacity
Storage capacity 300 m3

Russia

Topas

Tug/salvage vessel 35 t pull
Storage capacity 120 m3

Russia

Kit

Oil recovery vessel

Russia

Pribreshny

Oil recovery vessel

Russia

Sprut-2

Barge

Used in salvage operations

German
y

Arkona

Multi-purpose
vessel

2 x sweeping arm systems with 320
m3/h capacity each
Oil separation plant
Heating system
Gas detection systems
Storage capacity 1 000 m3

German
y

Scharhörn

Multi-purpose
vessel

2 x sweeping arm systems with 320
m3/h capacity each
Oil separation plant
Heating system
Gas detection systems
Storage capacity 430 m3

German
y

Kiel

Multi-purpose
vessel

2 x sweeping arm systems with 100
m3/h capacity each
Oil separation plant
Storage capacity 350 m3
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German
y

Bottsand

Oil recovery vessel

2 x sweeping systems with 160 m3/h
capacity each
Oil separation plant
Storage capacity 790 m3

German
y

Vilm

Oil recovery vessel

2 x sweeping arm systems with 160
m3/h capacity each
Oil separation plant
Storage capacity 320 m3

Sweden

KBV 002 Triton

Multi-purpose
vessel

Lamor system with 400 m3/h
capacity
3 x 300 m AllMaritim NOFI boom
500 m Lamor sorbent boom
Storage capacity 1 100 m3
Oil analysis laboratory

Sweden

KBV 003
Amfitrite

Multi-purpose
vessel

Lamor system with 400 m3/h
capacity
500 m Lamor sorbent boom
Storage capacity 1 100 m3
Oil analysis laboratory

Sweden

KBV 201

Multi-purpose
vessel

Advancing cassette system
Storage capacity 104 m3

Sweden

KBV 202

Multi-purpose
vessel

Advancing cassette system
Storage capacity 104 m3

Sweden

KBV 005

Multi-purpose
vessel

Advancing cassette system
Skimmer
300 m boom
100 m absorbent boom
Storage capacity 233 m3
100 m3 Oilbag
10 x 1 m3 Oilbag

Sweden

KBV 010

Multi-purpose
vessel

Advancing cassette system
Skimmer
300 m boom
100 m absorbent boom
Storage capacity 212 m3
100 m3 Oilbag
10 x 1 m3 Oilbag

Sweden

KBV 045

Oil recovery vessel

Advancing cassette system
Skimmer
300 m boom
100 m absorbent boom
Storage capacity 150 m3
100 m3 Oilbag
10 x 1 m3 Oilbag

40

Country

Name

Type

Equipment

Sweden

KBV 046

Oil recovery vessel

Advancing cassette system
Skimmer
300 m boom
100 m absorbent boom
Storage capacity 150 m3
100 m3 Oilbag
10 x 1 m3 Oilbag

Sweden

KBV 047

Oil recovery vessel

Advancing cassette system
Skimmer
300 m boom
100 m absorbent boom
Storage capacity 150 m3
100 m3 Oilbag
10 x 1 m3 Oilbag

Sweden

KBV 866

Barge

Storage capacity 440 m3

EMSA

Kontio

Icebreaker

Two rigid sweeping arms, 12 m
Heavy duty boom 2x250 m
Brush skimmer
Oil slick detection system
Storage capacity 2 003 m3

EMSA

Aalborg

Tanker

Two flexible sweeping arms, 15,6 m
Single point inflation boom 400 m
Brush Skimmer; 2 x Arctic skimmers
Oil slick detection system
Storage capacity 4 487 m3

EMSA

Copenhagen

Tanker

Two flexible sweeping arms, 15,6 m
Single point inflation boom 400 m
Brush Skimmer; 2 x Arctic skimmers
Oil slick detection system
Storage capacity 4 487 m3

41

Jonas Pålsson
Marin miljöförvaltning
Citadellsvägen 29
P.O. Box 500
201 24 Malmö
jp@wmu.se
+46 40 35 63 22
+46 70 945 51 32

Olof Lindén
Marin miljöförvaltning
Citadellsvägen 29
P.O. Box 500
201 24 Malmö
jp@wmu.se
+46 40 35 63 22
+46 70 945 51 32

Marcus Olsson
Miljöstrategiska enheten
J A Hedlunds väg
291 89 Kristianstad
marcus.olsson@skane.se
+46 44 309 30 55
+ 46 768 89 04 77
42

